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THE MAKING OF THE
ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION OF 1970
by ELMER GERTZ*
As Edward S. Gilbreth phrased it in the Chicago Daily News
at the beginning of June, 1970, battle lines were being formed
at the Convention as the long-awaited Bill of Rights Report was
coming up for consideration on so-called first reading. (There
were to be three readings in all.) Our committee, as Gilbreth
said, had "wrestled" with the "hottest issues." Now the Convention as a whole would face the day of judgment on such basic
matters as abortion, gun control, the death penalty, free speech,
right of privacy, search and seizure, and eminent domain, not to
say such other explosive matters as non-discrimination, preliminary hearings for those accused of felonies, a new preamble the inventory of fireworks was almost inexhaustible. There were
twenty-seven proposed sections and the preamble, ten with minority reports. How long would it take the convention to battle
its way through the agenda? The optimists, according to Gilbreth's soundings, were saying two weeks: the pessimists a
month. And the Convention could not really spare that time.
President Samuel Witwer was constantly reminding us that we
were a month behind schedule. There were rumors of deals
between Downstate delegates and Cook County Democrats, between this group and that, on various proposals. Deals could
not stop oratory under the generous rules of the Convention.
When the rules were originally submitted to the Convention for
a vote, they had been considerably more generous in the amount
of time permitted each delegate for speech-making. I had made
the successful motion lopping off five minutes from the proposed
time allotment. As time had gone on, I had regretted that I
had not attempted to reduce the allotment further. Of course,
I favored full debate, but I felt that the orators, of whom we
*
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had a God's plenty, including one of His priests, could learn
to be less prolix; they could say more in less time.
Victor Arrigo gave a foretaste of what was to come well
before his individual dignity section was presented. There was
a proposal to delete mention of the World's Columbian Exposition of 1893 from the new Constitution. Of course, everyone,
including Arrigo, knew that the provision was no longer necessary. It had fulfilled its function and those many, like Thomas
Kelleghan, who found each word and phrase of the 1870 language sacred and immutable, were reconciled to its disappearance from the basic charter. Arrigo organized a mock protest,
in which he drew in virtually all of the delegates as honorary
Italians, protesting all affronts to that noble race of descendants
of the Romans. He declared that removing the provision would
give support to "scurilous claims" that Columbus was not the
true discoverer of America. For fifty-five minutes, by the solemnly moving clock, Arrigo recited the valorous deeds of gallant
Italians, and twenty (presumably of Italian descent) momentarily passed their votes in protest against kissing off the Columbian Exposition. Thomas J. McCracken, almost every discerning person's favorite Daley Democrat, consoled Arrigo that
"none of us are anti-Columbian, although in political philosophy
some of us are accused of being pre-Columbian."
Thus was the stage set for the debate to come on individual
dignity, with further flurries when anyone was so unwise as to
refer to the Latins, Romans, Italians, Sicilians or other designations, noble or ignoble, of Arrigo's proud ethnic group. Once a
clergyman, in his invocation to the Convention, dared speak disparagingly of some specimens of the Italian group. That meant
more Arrigo oratory; and one could be sure that it would be
stored up for the ultimate perorations.
On May 22, 1970, the Report of the Bill of Rights Committee, its Proposal No. 1, was formally presented to the Convention. One week later, on May 29, the first action with respect
to it was taken by the Convention in what is called the Committee of the Whole. After the chairman and some of the members
of the committee had outlined various sections and answered
questions from the floor, President Witwer asked that some of
the less controversial sections be voted on. Although this was
contrary to the procedure that the committee had insisted on, I
acquiesced.
Five sections with no changes from the 1870
Constitution were approved - Section 1 (Inherent and Inalienable Rights), Section 3 (Religious Freedom), Section 15 (Subordination of Military Power), Section 16 (Quartering of Soldiers),
and Section 18 (Free and Equal Elections). No section as to
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which any delegate raised any question or suggested the consideration of amendments was voted on. Then the convention recessed for the weekend.
On June 2, consideration of the Bill of Rights resumed.
Six sections were approved, in some instances with amendments
and in other instances without change. Section 4 (Freedom of
Speech) was approved with the defeat of the minority report to
delete the clause on truth as defense in libel actions. Section 5
(Trial by Jury) was approved after being amended to provide
that the General Assembly may authorize juries of not less than
six nor more than twelve. Lewis Wilson had proposed the
amendment, largely on the recommendation of Chief Justice
Underwood of the Illinois Supreme Court, made in his letter to
the chairman of the Committee. Section 9 (Rights after Indictment) and Section 10 (Protection against Self-incrimination) were approved as submitted. Section 11 (Limitation of
Penalties) was amended, on motion of Leonard Foster, to add
the previously defeated in committee objective of rehabilitation
of offenders, and then approved, after the defeat, 54 to 50, of an
amendment to prohibit the death penalty. Section 20 (Fundamental Principles of Civil Government) was approved after the
addition of a statement on individual responsibility, proposed by
Dwight Friedrich and previously defeated in committee.
The next day, June 3, five more sections were approved on
first reading: Section 8 (Indictments), Section 14 (Ex Post Facto
Laws), Section 17 (Right To Assemble and Petition), Section
19 (Right to Remedy and Justice), and Section 23 (Preliminary
Hearings). The minority report urging the deletion of Section
23 was defeated. The portion of Section 14 relating to the
State's immunity to suit was postponed to June 17 and, at that
time, ruled out of order by reason of the adoption of a General
Government proposal on the same subject. The change in
Section 17, the phrase, "to associate freely," was deleted.
The following day, June 4, only two highly controversial
sections - 2 (Due Process of Law and Equal Protection) and
6 (Searches, Seizures, Interceptions and Privacy) were approved. As to Section 2, the minority report, urging the deletion
of the phrase, "including the unborn," was approved, 80 to 32,
after an extensive and exciting debate, of which we shall have
more to say later. Four amendments to Section 6 were defeated
before first reading approval of the section.
On June 5, Section 15 (Right of Eminent Domain) was
amended to delete the reference to "impaired use" as the basis
for compensation and amended, also, to delete the requirement
for compensation to "full extent of loss"; then the section was
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approved after the minority report was withdrawn, its purposes
having been achieved by the floor amendments. The same day
the majority preamble was approved after the defeat of the
minority report.
On June 9, four sections were considered, some with extended debate. Section 21 (Rights Retained) was readily approved. Section 22 (Freedom from Discrimination in Employment and Property) was approved with relative ease, 90 to 6,
despite the prior fears that it might face the difficulties that
open housing and fair employment proposals always encountered
in the General Assembly. Section 24 (Public Employment) was
deleted, after a struggle, when the minority report against any
provision on the subject was approved. Section 25 (Basic
Needs) failed to obtain the 59 votes required by the Convention
rules and was sent back to the Committee, which took no further
action on it.
The next day, June 10, two sections - Section 26 (IndivMual Dignity) by a vote of 60 to 27 after acrimonious debate,
and Section 7 (Bail and Habeas Corpus) by a vote of 82 to 0 were approved. The approval of Section 26 was preceded by
the defeat of the minority report which urged that no such
section be added to the Bill of Rights. Despite the unanimous
approval of Section 7, it had been preceded by a debate on the
minority report, subsequently defeated, which favored the liberalizing of the bail provisions.
The same day, June 10, the authors of the unsuccessful report on bail, Gertz, Albert Raby and Bernard Weisberg, prevailed with their minority report on liberalized provisions as to
fines in criminal cases, and Section 12 (Imprisonment for Debt)
was approved as amended by the minority report.
The next day, June 11, there was a classical debate on Section 27 (Right to Arms). The minority report of Gertz, Raby
and Weisberg, opposing such provision, was defeated, and the
majority Section 27 approved 86 to 16. The minority made
more noise than the vote indicated.
The same day, the suggested sections on consumer protection, proposed by David Stahl, and individual privacy, proposed
by Paul Elward, were defeated.
Now the Preamble and Bill of Rights were in the hands of
the Committee on Style and Drafting and Submission to prepare
for second reading.
But after this cursory summary of the Preamble and Bill
of Rights on first reading, it will be well to retrace the story
and tell some of the more exciting episodes of the floor debate.

Illinois Constitution

Space does not permit a full account of the debate on each
section, or, indeed, on many. Only the flavor may be savored.
Some of the motivation that went into the strong vote on
the right to arms provision was described for me by delegate
Ralph Dunn, from Du Quoin in Southern Illinois. Dunn called
himself and J. Lester Buford, Robert Butler, Henry Hendren
and David Kenney the "Mountaineers." Dunn felt, instinctively,
regardless of his own beliefs, that the people in this area would
not be too enthusiastic about the new rights that we set forth in
the Bill of Rights, save for the gun section. But he knew that
our Committee was one of the true sights of the Convention,
and he made it a point to have his visiting constituents spend
time with us. He would point out Father Lawlor, Raby and
myself as "a distinguished and famous group" and tell of my
activities in the Leopold and Ruby cases and, "if it was a proper
audience," of Father Lawlor's exhibit of a fetus in a bottle.
Dunn is not a gun owner nor a hunter, but he knows his people.
So when some of his constituents - the Pinckneyville Business
and Professional Women's Club - were in the visitors' gallery,
he made his famous speech in support of the gun section, knowing that word of it would be taken to the folks back home. He
said, in the highly personalized fashion that distinguished him:
"People in Southern Illinois perhaps are closer to frontier
days than some of you urban dwellers. Many of our ancestors
came from Virginia through Tennessee and Kentucky and settled in Illinois not too many generations ago. If someone tried
to take my grandfather's gun away from him, that person would
have suffered bodily harm!
"And I'm sure you know, people in our district are very
much opposed to the present gun-owners registration law. Representative Gale Williams has won great fame and honor in his
district by leading the fight for repeal of this onerous law. Had
this proposed amendment never been offered, no one would have
felt injured, but since it has been proposed, to not pass it will
make the people of Southern Illinois feel that a right has been
taken away. I submit the feeling among our people is that gun
registration is a first step toward confiscation of weapons.
"I submit that guns still serve many useful purposes in
Southern Illinois: many a father has a shotgun in his closet
that is used on certain social occasions. I certainly don't want to
deny him that privilege."
I had assumed that the Cook County Democrats would
oppose the provision when the Corporation Counsel of Chicago,
Richard L. Curry, the Mayor's own cousin, sent Marvin Aspen, a
highly regarded personal representative, to the Bill of Rights
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Committee to correct the impression given by Leonard Foster
that the proposed gun provision was agreeable to him. He and
the Chief of Detectives of Chicago, Michael Spiotto, made it clear
that they favored the most rigid gun control. But Paul Elward,
for long an advocate of such control in the General Assembly,
declared, with amazing conviction: "For the first time we are
getting constitutional underpinning for gun control legislation.
This invalidates no existing law or ordinance." He added,
piously: "We need less violence in our society, verbal as well as
physical."
That was the very reason I could not understand why the
"Daley cohorts," as I described them in an appeal to the Convention, were going along with the gun proponents. I read some
comments by Daley in the morning press when gun violence
against the police was reported. Guns will be used when they
are around, I stressed. Weisberg made a more eloquent plea in
behalf of our minority report, as did some of the best men and
women at the Convention. We were fortunate to receive as
many as forty votes for our report, considering the unnatural
ganging up against us. That was our high tide. Following
the defeat of our report, the majority proposal won 86 to 16.
That was what almost invariably happened at the Convention.
Once the opposition was downed, many who had favored its
viewpoint would swing to the majority viewpoint. That is why
one must study the interim votes in order to size up a situation
accurately.
The Mayor's own son, Richard Daley, with whom I had
enjoyed an excellent personal relationship, reacted strongly to
my use of the phrase, "Daley cohorts." He read into it a critical
spirit that was not intended, and I thought it politic to say so
in a speech in response in which I stressed my long-time support
of Daley, despite our differences. On another occasion I reminded the party stalwarts, such as Elward, that I had been a
registered Democrat for forty years, while some of them were
non-voting youngsters. This prompted young Michael Madigan
to come up to me and say, "Elmer, do me a favor - don't
register as a Democrat next time." The most serious debates
were relieved by such by-plays. For myself, I was content to be
judged by such staunch Democrats as Thomas McCracken and
Philip Carey, rather than the shrill partisans, who made it so
difficult to reach a consensus on any issue.
While the first-reading debate was still going on in the
Convention Committee of the Whole as to the Bill of Rights,
the Chicago Sun-Times published one of its numerous editorials
on our work. It said:
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"We have found occasion for both criticism and praise,
because the Bill of Rights contains sensitive, controversial, even
volatile, matter. Still to be debated, for instance, is an unfortunate freeing up of the right to keep and bear arms. Our
stand there is well known. We favor more control, not less.
"Nonetheless, we think it proper that the committee which
constructed the proposed Bill of Rights be credited for a difficult
job well done."
It told of the dedicated spirit in which we had worked, on
committee and in the general sessions of the Convention. It
concluded:
"We commend the Bill of Rights Committee, a disparate
group of individuals, for doing as well as it has with this basic
democratic task."
There is much that can be said about the effort to abolish
the death penalty, and, for clarity, it should be said in one place,
rather than broken up in segments. I have always had great
moral fervor against the ancient and barbaric institution of
capital punishment. I have filed amici curiae briefs in death
cases in the United States Supreme Court in behalf of the
American Civil Liberties Union, various religious denominations
and others, and have made countless speeches and written many
articles on the subject. Naturally, I filed a Member Proposal
on abolition, but I gave hard thought to the advisability of impairing the chances of the approval of the proposed Constitution
by pushing abolition. I talked over the matter with Bernard
Weisberg, who felt as strongly as I did and whose judgment I
respected. Despite the strong and moving testimony that was
introduced, we decided against going through with a committee
vote.
Then the section on penalties after conviction came up
before the Convention, and Wayne Whalen, seconded by Robert
Canfield, a former State's Attorney and a Republican, and Philip
Carey, a Daley Democrat, moved an amendment to ban the death
penalty. Now that the issue was raised, I felt under the moral
compulsion to support the amendment and I did as much as
anyone in its behalf. Much to my amazement, we lost by a
narrow vote, 54 to 50, despite the strong opposition of Paul
Elward and other retributive-minded delegates. As I left the
chamber following the vote, a number of delegates, including
Lewis Wilson, volunteered that if there were a separate submission on abolition, (that is, a choice given to the voters) they
would support it. For the first time, I developed a degree of
optimism and began to work diligently toward adoption of a
separate submission proposal.
Although it remained the
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Whalen-Canfield-Carey proposal,, I think that my role was at
least as important in lining up support. Clifton Kelley, a young
black delegate, was of the greatest help to us. Almost all of the
blacks -were with us, including organization stalwarts like Odas
Nicholson. On second reading we prevailed. By third reading,
I personally was able to win over some of the opponents, as we
won handily. This was fortunate, as some of the supporters
were not around when the vote was taken. Thus are issues
decided in any deliberative body! For the first time, I permitted
myself a large degree of optimism.
Then came the time when we were supposed to line up
popular support for. abolition. The Illinois Committee for the
Abolition of Capital Punishment mounted a campaign for the
proposal, with the renowned lawyer, Albert Jenner, Jr., as honorary chairman, and Hans Mattick, Willard Lassers and myself
as the active leaders. We had a budget and a staff and probably
the best literature on any proposal. We used the radio and
television, the churches and the black community. There was no
active campaign against the proposition. Neither political party
took a stand. For years public opinion polls had shown an increasing percentage of the people against the death penalty until the law-and-order syndrome set in. I debated with the
State's Attorney of Cook County over television and seemed to
win on points. But when the votes were counted, abolition suffered a worse defeat than any proposition. It was a disaster. The
reasons? Perhaps, because I was the only delegate to devote
considerable effort to the campaign; a few others did a bit, but
only a bit. Wayne Whalen, quite properly, was too busy on the
judicial selection proposition. It may have been the Speck case,
the times. At any rate, we lost badly.
One of those who participated most effectively in the debate
on the section relating to preliminary hearings on felony charges
was John M. Karns, Jr., chairman of the Committee on Finance
and Revenue, who, when State's Attorney of his county, had
employed a member of :our. Committee, William Fennoy, as an
investigator. Karns and Fennoy did not look at the preliminary
hearing proposal in the same light. Feeling it important to incorporate the views of Karns on this important matter, I elicited
this comment from him, which brought forth some of the "secret
history" of the Convention:
"As you will recall, I testified before your committee and
was also active in debate before the Convention on the inclusion
of a provision requiring a preliminary hearing as a matter of
constitutional right.
"My thoughts on this can be summed up briefly: to my
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knowledge, no other state constitution nor the Constitution of
the United States (see Coleman v. State of Alabama) requires
a preliminary hearing as a matter of constitutional right; additionally, I felt the matter was adequately covered in the Illinois
Code of Criminal Procedure.
"I understand that the committee did include such a provision in its report on first reading, largely at the insistence of
my fellow delegate, William Fennoy, who in my opinion, had
some mistaken notions about the efficacy of a preliminary hearing
as an important protection of the rights of accused.
"On first reading, I moved the deletion of the provision
which I recall then carried. In argument supporting my motion,
I advanced the idea that certain investigations are only effective
if brought initially before a grand jury, particularly those dealing with crimes of public officials and certain types of organized
criminal activities such as gambling, and to require preliminary
hearings in such instances would legally destroy the grand jury
as an effective investigative tool in those types of investigations.
"After the provision was initially deleted, Delegate Parkhurst moved a substitute provision that presently appears as
Paragraph 2, Section 7 of the Bill of Rights. I was curious at
that time about John's interest in these matters and was later
informed that he did this at the request of President Witwer
who, for some reason, was interested in some provision regarding preliminary hearings appearing in the Bill of Rights.
"I might add, the matter was further complicated by the
decision of the Supreme Court in the Coleman case, which held
that a preliminary hearing is a critical stage of the prosecution
and may require the appointment of counsel to an indigent
defendant in some circumstances. It should be noted, however,
that Coleman does not hold that a preliminary hearing is a constitutionally mandated requirement.
"I might add, that I don't particularly have a strong feeling
in the matter since I feel that the provision as written adds
nothing to the requirements already contained in the Illinois
Code of Criminal Procedure. I would assume that this is a right
which the defendant may waive, and in my experience, usually
would waive."
David Stahl, Mayor Daley's administrative assistant, was
one of the most hard-working and effective delegates. At times,
rarely it is true, he strayed from his organization colleagues on
his votes and in the proposals he put forth. Feeling that a personal note from him might lend intimacy to this narrative, I
wrote to Stahl for his comments. He replied:
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"As your parenthetical note indicates, my activities with
respect to your committee centered principally around the consumer rights issue, although I did introduce several proposals
regarding the arts which, as I recall, were referred to your
committee.
"I suspect that the transcript of the Convention and the
roll call on first reading says all that really needs to be said about
the consumer rights effort. As you will recall, my proposal was
first referred to the Rules Committee where it almost died.
With the intervention of several friends on the Rules Committee
it was referred to the Legislative Committee rather than dying
in Rules. With the consent of George Lewis and yourself, it was
informally reassigned to the Bill of Rights Committee but because of the excitement which your committee was constantly
creating, it never got a hearing before your committee. The
transcript should reflect President Witwer's impatience with my
amendment as well as the concern he expressed to me that the
whole debate and consideration of the matter not take more than
an hour. As I recollect, we spent an hour and fifteen minutes
on the floor discussing consumer rights although many of those
who spoke for the amendment did much more by way of presentation of their remarks.
"While I don't regard the loss of the consumer rights section as a great calamity, it would have been another reason for
people to vote for the new Constitution. With regard to specifically what we proposed, I must admit we had a terrible time
getting the right language and I suspect it was defeated because
we didn't ever get the right solution to the semantics problem of
saying what we really meant."
Stahl expressed a dilemma that beset others. If he who was
so articulate - he was chairman of the Convention's Public
Information Committee - had such difficulty, imagine the
difficulty of others.
The delegates were an introspective group, often analyzing
themselves and others as if they were characters in a Russian
novel. Still, they were Americans, with great faith in gadgets
and computers, and thought that statistical tables, questionnaires, polls and mere numbers had great meaning. They, especially the members of the Bill of Rights Committee, were all
intrigued when rumbles arose as to an ideological rating of
delegates by the young Vice President of the Convention, John
Alexander, somewhat of a political pundit. He took seven pivotal issues that were voted on in the course of the first reading
of the Bill of Rights and for each favorable vote on each of
them he gave one point. The perfect liberal would have seven
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points; the fewer points you had, the less liberal you were. It
was simplicity itself. Charles N. Wheeler, III told the whole
story in an exclusive feature article in the Chicago Sun-Times.
Paul F. Elward called it "a silly waste of time and not an
accurate reflection of anybody's political philosophy," but he had
voted liberal, according to Alexander's test, only once. Convention Vice President Thomas G. Lyons, who also had voted liberal
only once, commented: "I don't think my liberal record is going
to be tarnished by this survey." On the other hand, young
Jeffrey R. Ladd, who considered himself a "conservative, responsible Republican," was disturbed that he was found to be in
the upper levels of liberalism with a 6. "The study is very
unscientific," he said. Did this lead him ultimately to cast the
one vote against the Bill of Rights on final reading? The human
psyche is sometimes peculiar, to say the least. I, who rated a
7, naturally thought Alexander's study "basically sound." I
observed, smugly: "It's the most interesting document to come
out of the Convention so far." Thomas C. Kelleghan rated 0 by
the Alexander test.
According to Alexander, you were a liberal if you voted
as to each of the following:
1) the elimination of the allegedly federally unconFOR:
stitutional clause in the freedom of speech section; 2) abolition
of capital punishment; 3) extending the right of collective bargaining to public employees.
1) deletion of the provision requiring a prompt
AGAINST:
preliminary hearing for persons charged with felonies; 2) including the unborn in the due process section; 3) an amendment
to the anti-discrimination section intended to protect property
owners' rights; 4) the right to bear arms section.
The majority. of the Convention had favored the liberal
position on three of the issues and had voted against on four.
Ultimately, it had restored the balance somewhat by voting for
separate submission on capital punishment.
The members of the Bill of Rights Committee rated as
follows:
Those from Chicago
Victor A. Arrigo
Leonard N. Foster
Elmer Gertz
James Kemp
Father Francis S. Lawlor
Albert A. Raby
Bernard Weisberg

2
4
7
5
2
7
7
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Suburban Members
5
John E. Dvorak
Thomas C. Kellegan
0
Arthur T. Lennon
2
Virginia B. MacDonald
4
Roy C. Pechous
3
Downstate Members
William F. Fennoy, Jr.
2 (plus two absences)
Matthew A. Hutmacher
1
Lewis D. Wilson
5
Thus, as might have been expected, Gertz, Raby and Weisberg, who so often joined in minority reports, were at the top
as liberals, with 7 points each; Kelleghan was the least liberal,
with no points, closely followed by Hutmacher with 1 point,
Arrigo, Father Lawler and Lennon each with 2 points
(omitting Fennoy because of absences) ; in the center were
Kemp, Dvorak and Wilson, each with 5 points. One could
play with these figures, as Alexander did, and come up with
such interesting facts as that the Republicans and Democrats
as a whole were 3.1 in rating, just below the middle; independents as a whole were near the top .with 6.3; suburban delegates were somewhat more liberal than Chicago delegates 4 to 3.3, while downstaters were 3.1; the women averaged 5.3,
while the men averaged 3.1; overall the Convention delegates
rated about neutral - 3.4.
What this meant at the time, or would mean as the Convention progressed, was not readily foreseeable. Other ratings
were made, the most scientific by David Connor, the banker
delegate from Peoria. He had his computer show how each
delegate compared in voting with every other delegate on first,
second and third readings. The ratios differed somewhat from
reading to reading, but they told a significant story. There was
no effort by the computer, or by Connor, to describe anyone as
liberal, conservative, radical or reactionary; but there was raw
material for all sorts of analogies. At one point, for example,
Albert Raby and President Witwer had the greatest degree of
similarity in voting patterns; on one reading I was closest to
Weisberg, on another to Dawn Clark Netsch and Frank Cicero.
The latter, Italian in origin like Arrigo, had petulently passed
his vote on the Bill of Rights on one occasion, as I recall, because of his disgust over Arrigo's individual dignity provision.
I have already stressed my great confidence in Lewis
Wilson, despite our very considerable differences in political
philosophy. In writing to me after the Convention was over
and the Constitution adopted, he pointed out certain things
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about our committee that I may not have stressed sufficiently:
"I believe the striking characteristic of our committee was
the diversity in background and experience of its fifteen members. I doubt that this was equalled by any other committee.
"We had Republicans, regular Democrats, Independent
Democrats; Jews, Catholics and Protestants; blacks and whites;
one woman; ultra-conservatives (I believe I am in this category) and liberals; strong 'party' people (e.g. Arrigo, Lennon,
MacDonald) and those who were not; at least one strong labor
man (Kemp) and at least one who had always been allied with
the management side (myself).
"Only geographically was such complete diversity lacking.
There were seven members from Chicago itself and five more
from the Chicago metropolitan area - a total of twelve of the
fifteen. That left three of us from downstate. All of us were
from cities along the Mississippi and at least two of us (Fennoy
and I) were from industrial areas - and the same is true of
Hutmacher to a somewhat less extent. Outside of Fennoy,
possibly, there was no member of the committee from that
great portion (geographically) of the State from Springfield
south to the Ohio river.
"I assume the answer to this is that most of the Bill of
Rights problems arise in the Chicago area, for obvious reasons
and, therefore, this area should have predominant representation. I am not sure, however, that this is a wholly good
answer.
"I think it is in order to note that two of the committee
members opposed the Constitution as finally adopted (Kelleghan and Kemp) .... In view of the fact that only a very few
of the total number of delegates opposed the Constitution, I
would feel our committee had a higher percentage of its members in opposition than did any other committee."
On July 2, 1970, the Bill of Rights Article came out of the
Committee on Style, Drafting and Submission very little
changed from first reading form, but lacking for the time being
the Preamble, still being considered by that committee. In
the last weeks of the Convention, this committee, chaired by the
brilliant and resourceful young battler from Hanover, Wayne
W. Whalen, was probably the busiest and most successful of
all the committees of the Convention. Whalen, elected as a
Democrat, was part of the independent block which included
Gertz, Raby and Weisberg of the Bill of Rights Committee.
These independents and their associates and sometime allies
frequently conferred and often coordinated their efforts. Each
was a distinct personality, conscientious and independent in a
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thoroughgoing sense. Yet, on basic matters, they generally
followed a similar voting pattern, however their reasoning and
manner differed.
Lewis Wilson was Vice Chairman of Whalen's committee
and, in a sense, the representative of the Bill of Rights Committee on Style and Drafting. The chairman and counsel of
Style and Drafting conferred with me on all proposed changes
in the Bill of Rights and, to be sure that there would be no
uproar, they also conferred with other members of the committee. They were trying to make certain that some sort of
consensus would be achieved.
Style and Drafting suggested that the old section on subordination of military power be moved to the Militia article and
that the section on elections be moved, as suggested by Peter
Tomei, to the article on Suffrage and Elections. Nobody objected and the removals were accomplished as a matter of
course. Whether or not the changes in location had any effect
constitutionally remains to be seen, but is extremely doubtful.
Style and Drafting also contemplated the removal of
Dwight Friedrich's language about individual obligations and
responsibilities to the Preamble; but, in the end, it remained
in the section on Fundamental Principles, (Section 23) where
it had initially been placed and where it really belonged.
The section on preliminary hearing in criminal matters was
added to the section on indictment, as suggested by the Bill of
of Rights Committee. It was obviously a good decision.
For the rest, the proposed changes were truly stylistic, as
contemplated when the role of the Style and Drafting Committee was delineated. Punctuation was added, subtracted or
changed; words of greater clarity were substituted for those
of lesser clarity; in all, the language was tightened up, so that
the meaning of each section became self-evident. Where the
exigencies of Convention realities required it, the sometimes
archaic language of the older sections, redolent with tradition,
were retained.
One change in the order of language in the amended section
on searches, seizures, privacy and interceptions strengthened
the section substantively, I thought. By placing the phrase
"invasions of privacy" after "seizures," instead of at the end of
the sequence, I thought the phrase was given body and blood.
It was no longer a dangling and perhaps useless limb.
There followed discussions, proposed amendments and substitutions and votes on second reading. The Bill of Rights and
Preamble remained substantially as on first reading, with a
few important changes, referred to later.

Illinois Constitution

The Report of the Style, Drafting and Submission Committee, following the completion of second reading in the
Committee of the Whole, encompassed the entire new Constitution, including proposed separate submissions, Committee
recommendations and the Transition Schedule. Very little in
the way of textual changes was proposed for the Preamble and
the Bill of Rights. There was again new language to clarify
the meaning of preliminary hearings in criminal cases. The
new concept of the goal of rehabilitation in penalties was
phrased more precisely. The new section on discrimination on
the basis of sex ("women's lib"), proposed and approved on the
floor of the Convention, was rephrased to conform with the
requirements of other articles - on local government and the
schools. Otherwise the language changes were minor.
In conformity with the floor vote on second reading, there
were two separate submissions with respect to the Bill of
Rights whether to add the sentence, "No penalty shall
prescribe death," in Section 11 on Limitation of Penalties after
Conviction, and whether to add a new section with respect to
non-discrimination for the physically or mentally handicapped.
It was already apparent that the latter proposed separate submission, forced by some who should have favored the inclusion
of the section in the body of the Constitution, was creating
troubled spirits and rebellion. Many regarded it as insulting
to those already suffering sufficiently. There was bound to be
much discussion of the matter on third, the final, reading.
This was the stage in the proceedings in which substantial
amendments and substitutions were no longer freely permitted.
For such changes the rules required, in the first instance, suspension of the rules by a constitutional majority of 59, and then
passage by at least the same vote. When Style, Drafting and
Submission presented its report, under date of August 26, 1970,
with very little time left for us to complete our work, it was
doubtful that the Convention would tolerate many suspensions
of the rules. But surprise is the overriding rule of conventions,
as well as of life, and one could look forward to fireworks,
whether confidently or tensely.
The Transition Schedule declared that any rights, procedural or substantive, created for the first time by the Bill of
Rights Article, shall be prospective and not retroactive. There
could be no objection to this; and it was probably implicit,
anyway, in due process. Section 17, relating to non-discrimination in employment and property, was to become effective on
July 1, 1971, reasonable in view of the then circumstances and
the newness and far-reaching consequences of the rights cre-
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ated. Of course, later the Constitution 'as a whole was made
effective as of that date.
On August 27, 1970, Wayne Whalen, as Chairman of the
Style, Drafting and Submission Committee, presented the proposed new Constitution with the changes made by his committee, following the approvals on second reading of each of the
articles and sections. Point by point he first took up the
Preamble and the Bill of Rights, pointing out exactly what was
done by his committee and why. Questions were raised by the
always active Thomas McCracken as to whether or not a substantive change was inadvertently made in the section on
discrimination with respect to sex. Delegates Frank Cicero,
Mary Lee Leahy, John Parkhurst, and Malcolm Kamin rose to
the defense of the committee. It appeared probable that the
Convention was going to be bogged down again on some relatively unimportant detail at the very time when it was necessary
for it to proceed with greater speed than at any time in its
deliberations. At that point, I, as Chairman of the Bill of
Rights Committee, suggested that we vote on the rest of the
Preamble and Bill of Rights and reserve judgment on the
section that had aroused the controversy. This was approved
by the Convention and at last, as far as language was concerned,
approval was voted.
The next day, August 28, 1970, on further consideration, I
withdrew my earlier request for a division as to the section in
question and moved that the Preamble and Bill of Rights be
approved at third and final reading and for preparation for
enrollment. Yet, again, there were impediments to speedy
action. David Connor had been interrogated by the Chief
of Police in Peoria as to the section which incorporated the ban
on unreasonable invasions of privacy and interceptions of communications. He wanted to know what invasion of privacy
meant, how it would affect visual surveillance by the police, how
it would affect the performance of other ordinary duties by
those charged with law enforcement. The Chief of Police had
thought that the provision might impair the efficiency of law
enforcement agencies. I tried to explain, as best I could, why
I felt that the fears were unreasonable. I was referred to a
case then pending in the United States Supreme Court and,
since then, decided adversely to the contention of those who
wanted a complete ban on all electronic surveillance and interceptions. I pointed out that Bernard Weisberg and other
members of our committee felt that single party consent would
still govern and thus the police might in Certain designated
circumstances intercept communications. Leonard Foster was
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not sure that my explanation was correct. I did not agree with
much of what he said, but I felt it inadvisable to spell out my
differences and simply pointed out that we would all have to
wait for court interpretation of the provision.
Past the hurdle, Leonard Foster now confronted us with
another hurdle. He wanted us to combine the three sections
on non-discrimination. Regretfully, I raised a point of order
the necessity for suspension of the rules, and was sustained
by President Witwer. Foster moved for suspension of the
rules. The suspension of the rules failed. Section 19 relating
to non-discrimination with respect to the physically and mentally handicapped had been added to the Bill of Rights the
previous day. It was no longer a matter of separate submission.
Some of the shame of our earlier action was wiped out.
The clerk proceeded with the roll call of delegates on the
motion for the final passage of the Bill of Rights and Preamble
and all went on swimmingly until Odas Nicholson was reached.
She was troubled because I had withdrawn my motion for a
division which separated Section 18 (the Women's Lib section)
from the total package. Miss Nicholson disagreed with me
that there was no longer need for a division. The roll call was
suspended and she was given leave to make whatever point she
chose to make. Thomas Lyons was presiding at that time.
Because of further parliamentary maneuvers, it was necessary
to vote formally as to whether or not the roll call would be
suspended to allow Miss Nicholson to speak. By a narrow
margin this was done. Miss Nicholson said she wanted to have
the changes made by the Style, Drafting and Submission Committee replaced by the language that had appeared in the section when it was adopted on second reading. Wayne Whalen
explained again why he thought this was wrong. Miss Nicholson was not persuaded. There followed an exchange between
the two, which was not always clear to the other delegates. I
tried to resolve the matter again by pointing out that equal
protection of the laws would protect women in this area completely. Foster agreed that there was nothing in Section 18
that was not already covered by the due process and equal
protection of the law section. Miss Nicholson made cutting
remarks with respect to Foster's pronouncement. We seemed
to be stalled once more. I moved that we proceed with the roll
call and, to my relief, there was no objection. But Gloria
Pughsley remarked that she had to pass, when roll call was
resumed, because she did not want the matter to be railroaded
through without satisfying Miss Nicholson's question. Finally,
the Preamble and Bill of Rights were approved with only one
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nay vote but with 14 passing. Those of us on the Bill of
Rights Committee had thus accomplished our objective more
readily than we had dared hope when the Convention began
months previously.
As the three readings went on in the Convention, with the
ensuing excitement of debate and votes and public discussion on
the reports of the various committees, it became increasingly
clear that the early impression of our committee was changing.
Where once there was hostility, amusement, bewilderment and
the feeling of impending disaster, there was now friendliness,
admiration and a sense of triumph. This was reflected in the
media and even more in the conversation of delegates. Constantly, men and women would come up to me to express their
regard for what we had done and how we had handled ourselves in the Convention. It was not alone those in our own
camp who were almost buoyant in what they had to say. That
arch-conservative, Ted Borek, talked almost in wonderment as
to how the Bill of Rights Committee had prevailed, where others
had failed. It was not that Borek was in agreement with us;
quite the contrary. But he admired a workmanlike job. Thomas
McCracken, on more than one occasion said to me, "Elmer, I
admire you, even when I disagree. You know what you want,
and you are not diverted." And Victor Arrigo, in that deep,
resonant voice of his, would constantly coo over how we had
handled ourselves. "We are models for the Convention," he
intoned.
This was not wholly fortuitous. I had made up my mind,
before our report came before the Convention, that I would
studiously avoid affronting those upon whom we depended for
votes. Despite my strong feelings on many issues, I determinedly restricted my participation in the debate - until our
report was under consideration. Then I utilized all of the builtup goodwill. I tried to field the discussion. On the microphone
and away from it, I put forth the most persuasive arguments I
could muster. But I did not monopolize the time of the Convention or, indeed, of the committee. I pushed forward everyone who could help, whether it was Foster, Lennon, Weisberg,
Wilson or anyone else. So a new reputation was created, and
we all basked in it.
A number of sections were born on the floor of the Convention or outside of Springfield, rather than in committee. An
intriguing example of this is the provision which is now Section
5 (Pension and Retirement Rights) in the General Provisions
Article of the Constitution. Late in the life of our committee
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I began to receive an extraordinary number of communications
on the pension and retirement rights of government employees,
particularly those connected with state universities. These
people were sold the idea that their rights were imperiled and
that they would be left destitute or, at the very least, prejudiced,
unless the Bill of Rights contained a protective provision in
their behalf. I received hundreds, if not thousands, of letters
and petitions from them. No delegate received more communications on any one theme than I received on this one. I was
almost overwhelmed, and troubled. It became a subject of
conversation among delegates and the staff. I had the matter
researched by a bright young staff assistant, and wrote to all
of the many who had written to me. Frankly, I was not sure
as to what could properly be done in the Constitution, assuming,
as was not certain, that there was really a problem. Suddenly
delegate Helen Kinney came up with a proposal on the matter,
listing several sponsors but not myself! After insistence on
my part, my name was added to the list, and the proposal was
approved by the Convention. There was much pride of authorship at the Convention. Success or failure would often depend
upon whose name was signed to a proposal; likewise approval
or disapproval back home.
Chapters could be written about each battle as to each
provision on the Convention floor, during each of the three
readings, and in the secret conclaves and caucuses where delegates foregathered. The temptation is great to spin out the f ascinating tale in its manifold details, telling about the heroes
and villains and fainthearted in each struggle. Some decisions
were close, some overwhelming, some unexpected, some according to plan.
Two sections proposed by the Bill of Rights Committee on basic needs ,and the rights of public employees - were
eliminated completely; basic needs because a constitutional
majority was not obtained, the rights of public employees
because the Cook County Democrats joined with certain downstaters. Two ancient sections, on free and equal elections and
subordination of military power, were transferred to other
articles; and two new sections - no discrimination on the basis
of sex and no discrimination against the handicapped were
added, the first with virtually no struggle and the second after
considerable maneuvering and pressure. As to some sections
there were very considerable debates, but, in the end, the sections were left largely as we had recommended them; other
sections were expanded or contradicted and considerably modified on the floor.
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It proved to be easier than anticipated to get rid of the
mischievous phrase, "including the unborn," in the due process
clause; the women and the blacks, the Independents, most Republicans and most downstate Democrats united against it,
while the bulk of the Cook County Democrats and very few
others joined in the futile fight for the phrase.
It is worth telling the story. On June 4, 1970, Father Lawlor
offered the invocation, significant in view of the day's business.
The grim priest preached on the sacredness of life. "Help
us," he implored, "to respect this right to life which you give to all
others." He gave, in brief compass and in the guise of a prayer,
the arguments against destroying "those in need, the poor, the
blind, the lame, the lepers" and, by implication, although he did
not directly say so, the human fetus. Some minutes later, we
sat as a committee of the whole, and President Witwer called
upon me to proceed with the discussion on the work of the Bill
of Rights Committee. I aroused laughter by saying: "We
don't have dissenting votes on invocations, but it was a very
stirring invocation and the start of the debate I take it."
It was now Arthur Lennon's task to defend the use of the
words "including the unborn" in the due process and equal
protection section. Lennon, a very shrewd and resourceful
debater, made the most of the troublesome phrase, largely in
terms of the majority report, but spelling out why he contended
that the language was not revolutionary or extreme and consistent with what he deemed the law to be. Other delegates
quickly interrogated Lennon, starting with the brilliant young
man from Evanston, Frank Cicero, one of the group of independents. The interrogation became a debate, improper at that
phase of the proceedings, in which Leonard Foster and I expressed differences as to whether the phrase applied only to due
process or as to equal protection as well. I asked Lennon if the
phrase, "including the unborn," includes "the very moment of
conception." He hedged, I thought uncomfortably, in his response. I asked if the provision was self-implementing or if it
would require legislation. Again, I thought he hedged.
Now one after the other delegate got into the fray; their
questions, as mine and Cicero's, being a form of argumentation.
It was clear that almost everyone wanted to say something on
this highly controversal subject in which the Convention was
taking sides so noticeably. The women, the blacks, the independents and downstaters were sharply opposed to the proposed
language; the Daley Democrats strongly for it. Lennon fielded
the questions with great skill, but he was persuading only the
persuaded. Dwight Friedrich got to the heart of the matter at
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once. He pointed out that Father Lawlor suggested that life
begins with fertilization, and Rabbi Hershman, who one day
had given the invocation, said that in the Jewish faith life begins when the baby's head protrudes from the womb. Did this
not make it a religious question, and was that not undesirable?
Again, I wanted to inquire as to what facts or circumstances caused Lennon as an individual to sponsor the inclusion
of the phrase. He thought I was arguing with him and he would
not answer the question. Helen Kinney wanted to know the
effect of the phrase on laws relating to abortion. Lennon would
not give an unequivocal response.
The questions concluded for the moment, Lewis Wilson presented the minority views, I thought quite persuasively. He did
not hedge. He was blunt in stating his belief that the supporters of the majority report were intent upon preventing legislation to permit abortions. His argument for the minority report
was supplemented by Bernard Weisberg, as always shrewd in
his analysis of constitutional, legislative and practical issues.
It was easy to understand why his coldly rational tone disconcerted those as emotionally involved as Kelleghan.
Now Father Lawlor interposed what he regarded as questions and what President Witwer believed to be argumentation,
scheduled to come at a later stage. Father Lawlor stressed his
interest in life - when did it arise, when and how was it to be
protected. Now Wilson, now Weisberg, answered questions, as
Father Lawlor persisted in his line of quasi-interrogation.
Others joined in, some with much heat.
The questions on the minority report concluded, I moved
the substitution of the minority report, which excluded the
words, "including the unborn," for the majority report which
included those controversal words. One delegate was applauded
when he inquired why we could not proceed to a vote at once,
since everyone had obviously made up his mind on the subject.
President Witwer properly insisted that the only way to test the
matter was to ask who wanted to discuss the matter, as permitted by the rules.
With great emotion Clyde Parker, who was opposed to
capital punishment, declared that by reason of the same respect for life, he was for the majority report, which he said was
on the side of life. Father Lawlor quickly joined in. He complained about the effort to stifle debate; then went on and on in
his deeply felt defense of life against those who would trifle
with it. As he had exceeded the ten minutes allowed by the
rules, President Witwer interrupted him. "The system must go
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on," the Father commented. "Thank you." Witwer, stung,
assured him that he would have further opportunity for debate.
When the debate resumed after the luncheon recess,
Leonard Foster proclaimed that he agreed completely with the
statements made by Father Lawlor, but disagreed completely
with his conclusion. Kelleghan inveighed against those like
Paul Ehrlich who would equate life with pollution. Life to him
was sacred, and he would protect it by safeguarding the due
process rights of the unborn. Rev. Joseph Sharpe, a black
delegate strongly seconded Kelleghan in the name of God. He
was answered by Albert Raby. Once again the convention had
the opportunity to observe the moderation and reasonableness of
Raby in contrast to his reputation in some corners as an extremist.
Paul Mathias wanted to move the previous question, so that
debate would be terminated. President Witwer feared that this
would indicate an unwillingness to hear out arguments on both
sides. He did not put the question. Young Peter Tomei, a
devout Catholic, rose to state his conviction that matters of
conscience should not be ruled out in the manner of the majority
report. He was for the minority position. So the debate went
on, some almost trembling with emotion, others having at least
the outer aspect of calm and reasonableness. Father Lawlor
took the floor once more in his defense of life against those who
would destroy it. Clifford Kelley rose to question Father Lawlor's right to speak again; but the president, following the advice of the parliamentarian, said that Lawlor was in order, and
he went on, eloquently, obviously unable to see how there could
be differences of opinion on the subject.
Betty Howard, a tall, lovely and articulate delegate from
the suburbs, did oppose him "as a woman, a wife, a mother, and
a Christian." Henry Hendren pleaded that the matter go to a
vote. President Witwer asked Lennon to sum up for the majority and he did so in a manner that seemed to create differences in viewpoint between himself and Lawlor, whether of
strategy or conviction one could not be sure.
Then debate on this important subject was interrupted
while Harold Nudelman complained of the camera lights of the
media and President Witwer attempted to explain why freedom
of the press could not be interfered with. Nudelman was unsatisfied. John Knuppel tried to talk without being recognized
by the chair, and his microphone was cut off. Thus did tempers
rise with the tenseness of the discussion.
The motion to substitute the minority report for the committee majority was carried by 80 to 32. Despite all the debate,
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it was not even close. The motion to approve the minority
report, as substituted, a technical necessity, was then carried
92 to 8. The convention had overcome what might have been
one of the greatest obstacles towards the approval of any new
constitution.
Despite the support of the Catholic Bishops for the retention, intact and unchanged, of the Religious Freedom Section,
there was a group, largely Catholic in composition, that persistently sought to amend the section, as well as the section in the
Education article against the use of public funds for sectarian
purposes, by substituting the general language of the First
Amendment of the federal constitution or some other language.
Some professed to be Constitutional purists; others were
frankly in favor of giving assistance to parochial schools. The
Bishops thought that this could be done through the present
language; some delegates wanted to make this doubly certain.
None of them reckoned sufficiently with the United States
Supreme Court.
There was much less of a struggle than anticipated on the
section against discrimination in employment and the sale or
rental of property. In the end there were no more votes against
the provision in the Convention than in committee - a mere
half-dozen. This can be described as one of the miracles of our
nine months.
Our section on eminent domain was somewhat mangled,
largely because of those like Charles Young and James Strunck
who were extremely sensitive to the problems of public agencies, because they had long represented the government in condemnation matters.
In the end we came up with this Preamble and this Bill of
Rights:
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Adopted in Convention at Springfield, September
3, 1970. Ratified by the People, December 15,
1970. In force July 1, 1970.
PREAMBLE

We, the People of the State of Illinois - grateful to Almighty God for the civil, political and religious liberty which
He has permitted us to enjoy and seeking His blessing upon our
endeavors - in order to provide for the health, safety and
welfare of the people; maintain a representative and orderly
government; eliminate poverty and inequality; assure legal,
social and economic justice; provide opportunity for the fullest

The John Marshall Journalof Practiceand Procedure

238

[Vol. 5:215

development of the individual; insure domestic tranquillity;
provide for the common defense; and secure the blessings of
freedom and liberty to ourselves and our posterity - do ordain
and establish this Constitution for the State of Illinois.
ARTICLE I

BILL OF RIGHTS
SECTION 1.

INHERENT AND INALIENABLE RIGHTS

All men are by nature free and independent and have certain inherent and inalienable rights among which are life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness. To secure these rights and
the protection of property, governments are instituted among
men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.
2. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law nor be denied the equal protection
of the laws.
SECTION

3. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination, shall forever be guaranteed, and no person shall be denied any civil or political right,
privilege or capacity on account of his religious opinions; but
the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be construed
to dispense with oaths or affirmations, excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety
of the State. No person shall be required to attend or support
any ministry or place of worship against his consent, nor shall
any preference by* given by law to any religious denomination
or mode of worship.
SECTION

,*Probably should read "be."

4. FREEDOM OF SPEECH
All persons may speak, write and publish freely, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. In trials for libel, both
civil and criminal, the truth, when published with good motives
and for justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient defense.
SECTION

SECTION 5.

RIGHT To ASSEMBLE
The people have the right to
ner, to consult for the common
opinions to their representatives
grievances.

AND PETITION

assemble in a peaceable mangood, to make known their
and to apply for redress of

6. SEARCHES, SEIZURES, PRIVACY AND INTERCEPTIONS
The people shall have the right to be secure in their per-

SECTION
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sons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable
searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of
communications by eavesdropping devices or other means. No
warrant shall issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
7. INDICTMENT AND PRELIMINARY HEARING
No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
unless on indictment of a grand jury, except in cases in which
the punishment is by fine or by imprisonment other than in the
penitentiary, in cases of impeachment, and in cases arising in
the militia when in actual service in time of war or public
danger. The General Assembly by law may abolish the grand
jury or further limit its use.
No person shall be held to answer for a crime punishable
by death or by imprisonment in the penitentiary unless either
the initial charge has been brought by indictment of a grand
jury or the person has been given a prompt preliminary hearing
to establish probable cause.
SECTION

8. RIGHTS AFTER INDICTMENT
In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right
to appear and defend in person and by counsel; to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation and have a copy thereof; to
meet the witnesses face to face and to have process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; and to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed.
SECTION

9. BAIL AND HABEAS CORPUS
All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except
for capital offenses where the proof is evident or the presumption great. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not
be suspended except in cases of rebellion or invasion when the
public safety may require it.
SECTION

SECTION 10.

SELF-INCRIMINATION

AND

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

No person shall be compelled in a criminal case to give evidence against himself nor be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
SECTION 11.

LIMITATION OF PENALTIES AFTER CONVICTION

All penalties shall be determined both according to the
seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring
the offender to useful citizenship. No conviction shall work
corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate. No person shall be
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transported out of the State for an offense committed within
the State.
12. RIGHT TO REMEDY AND JUSTICE
Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for
all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy,
property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely,
completely, and promptly.
SECTION

13. TRIAL BY JURY
The right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate.
SECTION

SECTION 14.

IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT

No person shall be imprisoned for debt unless he refuses
to deliver up his estate for the benefit of his creditors as provided by law or unless there is a strong presumption of fraud.
No person shall be imprisoned for failure to pay a fine in a
criminal case unless he has been afforded adequate time to make
payment, in installments if necessary, and has willfully failed
to make payment.
15. RIGHT OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation as provided by law. Such compensation shall be determined by a jury as provided by law.
SECTION

16. Ex POST FACTO LAWS AND IMPAIRING CONTRACTS
No ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of
contracts or making an irrevocable grant of special privilege
or immunities, shall be passed.
SECTION

SECTION

17.

No

DISCRIMINATION

IN EMPLOYMENT

AND

THE

SALE OR RENTAL OF PROPERTY

All persons shall have the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of race, color, creed, national ancestry and sex
in the hiring and promotion practices of any employer or in the
sale or rental of property.
These rights are enforceable without action by the General
Assembly, but the General Assembly by law may establish reasonable exemptions relating to these rights and provide additional remedies for their violation.
SECTION 18.

No DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEX
The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or
abridged on account of sex by the State or its units of local
government and school districts.
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19.

No

DISCRIMINATION

AGAINST

THE HANDICAPPED

All persons with a physical or mental handicap shall be
free from discrimination in the sale or rental of property and
shall be free from discrimination unrelated to ability in the
hiring and promotion practices of any employer.
SECTION

20.

INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY

To promote individual dignity, communications that portray criminality, depravity or lack of virtue in, or that incite
violence, hatred, abuse or hostility toward, a person or group of
persons by reason of or by reference to religious, racial, ethnic,
national or regional affiliation are condemned.
SECTION 21.

QUARTERING OF SOLDIERS

No soldier in time of peace shall be quartered in a house
without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war except
as provided by law.
22. RIGHT TO ARMS
Subject only to the police power, the right of the individual
citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.
SECTION

SECTION 23.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

A frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles of
civil government is necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty. These blessings cannot endure unless the people recognize
their corresponding individual obligations and responsibilities.
24. RIGHTS RETAINED
The enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
individual citizens of the State.
SECTION

